When Britain and India announced a “historic” free trade agreement this spring, it underpinned how far the United Kingdom’s gaze has shifted beyond Europe. Nearly a decade after the Brexit referendum, British diplomats and trade officials are fanning out from the Atlantic to the Indo Pacific, pursuing new partnerships in a bid to redefine the UK’s role in a multipolar world. From joining a major Pacific trade bloc to courting Southeast Asia and forging a security pact in the Indian Ocean, the UK is navigating post-Brexit realities with a mix of realist strategy and post imperial reflection. The question is whether these emerging trade ties and alliances can truly compensate for lost influence closer to home or if they instead mark a humbler reinvention of Britain’s global posture between the Atlantic and Indian oceans.
Global Britain’s Indo-Pacific Tilt
British officials have taken to describing the Indo-Pacific as the new center of global gravity, and they are determined not to be left on the sidelines. In 2021, the UK government’s Integrated Review of security, defence and foreign policy formally declared an “Indo-Pacific tilt” at the heart of its post-Brexit strategy. The idea was to realign Britain’s foreign policy focus toward the high-growth economies of Asia and the strategic waterways linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. After decades preoccupied with Europe, the UK was, in essence, embarking on a “return to east of the Suez,” a phrase evoking Britain’s Cold War-era retreat from Asian commitments, this time as part of its “Global Britain” vision.
Officials argue this pivot is driven by hard-headed economics as much as grand strategy. Estimates indicate about half the world’s middle-class consumers are expected to live in the Indo-Pacific region by 2035. Tapping into those markets is critical for the UK to remain a “major player” outside the EU. “Our Armed Forces are the face of Global Britain and our presence in the region will play a vital role in keeping Britain safe as well as underpinning security in the Gulf,” said former Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson in 2018 as the UK opened a new naval base in Bahrain. That base, Britain’s first permanent military post east of Suez since 1971, symbolises the new commitment to the Indian Ocean and beyond, supporting Royal Navy deployments to keep trade routes secure.
The Indo-Pacific tilt has spanned trade, diplomacy and defense. The UK became ASEAN’s first new “Dialogue Partner” in a quarter century, a status granted in 2021 as a “strong regional vote of support for London’s post-Brexit engagement with Asia”. This gives Britain high-level access to ASEAN summits and forums, bolstering its diplomatic and economic ties with Southeast Asia. Historically, the UK maintained intricate links with ASEAN states like Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, all former colonies or Commonwealth members, but Brexit injected new urgency into strengthening those ties. As one regional analyst noted, London has undertaken a concerted “pivot to Asia” as part of remaking itself as an agile mercantile power under the rubric of Global Britain. In practice, that has meant pursuing trade deals across the Asia-Pacific and stepping up Britain’s participation in regional security, moves welcomed by partners wary of over-reliance on China.
Yet this eastward tilt is not without debate in London. With the European Union still accounting for 42% of UK exports, some skeptics question whether chasing Indo-Pacific opportunities is worth the diplomatic bandwidth. The opposition Conservative Party has signalled it may prioritise mending frayed EU ties over distant ventures if it takes power. Still, the broad contours of Britain’s strategy have endured across changing governments, an understanding that the 21st century’s economic and geopolitical currents are shifting south and east, and that Britain must swim in those waters to stay relevant.
CPTPP and the Pacific Horizon
On the economic front, “Global Britain” has been most visible in a drive to assemble new trade agreements beyond Europe. In the past few years the UK has rolled over or struck bilateral deals with the likes of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam, part of what officials describe as building “a network of trade agreements with dynamic economies far beyond Europe”. These deals laid the foundation for Britain’s entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), an Indo-Pacific trade bloc stretching from Canada to Malaysia. Henceforth, the UK became the first new member to accede to the CPTPP, and the first ever European country in the pact. The government hailed it as Britain’s biggest trade agreement since leaving the EU, one that opens access for British exporters to a combined GDP of £12 trillion.
Signing up to CPTPP is as much about geopolitics as economics. Business Secretary Kemi Badenoch, who flew to New Zealand to ink the deal, touted “significant” benefits for UK firms in a market of 500 million consumers. But critics quickly noted the numbers don’t exactly herald an export boom. By the government’s own estimates, CPTPP membership might add a mere 0.08% to Britain’s GDP over 10 years, about £1.8 billion annually. (Take for instance, the Office for Budget Responsibility projects Brexit will shrink UK GDP by 4% over 15 years) When pressed about this modest gain, Badenoch insisted the deal would pay off “if businesses use it”, while another trade minister stressed “billions of pounds” in new opportunities for individual companies.
The symbolic value of CPTPP is undoubtedly huge, it affirms Britain’s post-Brexit ability to broker trade accords and embeds the UK in a fast-growing region. “Britain is showing it can make a trade deal after Brexit, the impact appears mainly cosmetic,” observed one Asia-based analyst skeptically, adding that “no one in Asia is taking the pact very seriously”. Indubitably, the UK already had free trade agreements with 9 of the 11 CPTPP members that mostly carried over from EU days, so the practical changes are incremental. Howbeit, joining the bloc could yield strategic leverage. Britain will now have a vote on future CPTPP entrants, a live issue as China has applied to join the partnership. London has evinced that any new members must meet the pact’s high standards, implying it could veto Beijing’s entry if Chinese trade practices don’t align with CPTPP rules. Hence, the UK’s presence in this Pacific club positions it as a gatekeeper in the unfolding competition to set Asia-Pacific trade norms.
Even as it looks across the Pacific, Britain hasn’t neglected the Indian Ocean littoral. It has sought deeper trade ties with fast-growing economies like Indonesia and is in talks on a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Notably, the UK became an ASEAN Dialogue Partner in 2021, which London hopes will facilitate more commerce with Southeast Asia’s economically burgeoning 660 million people. British officials point out that many ASEAN states are hungry for investment in infrastructure, green technology and services, areas where UK companies have expertise. By plugging into ASEAN’s ecosystem of summits and working groups, the UK is betting it can broker deals and shape regional economic initiatives from within. The early evidence is encouraging, since attaining Dialogue Partner status, Britain has convened joint events like a UK–ASEAN Business Council and security dialogues on issues from climate to cyber security. While these forums are a far cry from the clout Britain enjoyed as a colonial power in Asia, they give “Global Britain” a platform to remain present and relevant in a region increasingly courted by China and the US alike.
UK–India FTA: Old Attempts, New Aspirations
Perhaps nowhere does Britain’s post-imperial trajectory play out more vividly than in its courtship of India. Seventy-five years after the end of the Raj (a term used to describe British rule in India), the UK now finds itself ardently pursuing a trade alliance with its former colony, on terms set by New Delhi. Negotiations for a UK–India free trade agreement (FTA) began in early 2022 amid great fanfare. The then Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, even promised a completed deal by Diwali of that year to dramatically showcase the Brexit dividend of an independent trade policy. That deadline came and went. Talks bogged down over contentious issues like market access for British financial services and visas for Indian professionals. As rounds of bargaining stretched on, through three changes of UK prime minister, it became conspicuous that sealing a deal with the world’s fifth-largest economy would be a marathon, not a sprint.
By the April of this year, with negotiations in their final stages, India’s Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal struck a confident tone, calling recent talks “productive”. Behind closed doors, compromises had been reached on long-sensitive areas, India agreed to slash its famously high tariffs on whisky and automobiles, while Britain conceded more access for Indian goods and workers. The breakthrough finally came in May 2025, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced an agreement in principle on a comprehensive FTA. U.K. negotiators gratifyingly proclaimed it the “best deal any country has ever agreed with India,” not a small boast, given India’s reputation for onerous bargaining. Details of the deal suggest the pact will eliminate or phase out tariffs on 90% of British goods sold in India, from Scotch whisky to machinery, and eventually make 85% of UK exports to India tariff-free. In return, 99% of Indian exports to the UK will enter duty-free, giving Indian textiles, jewellery and auto parts easier access to the British market. London estimates the deal could boost UK GDP by £4.8 billion in the long run and expand bilateral trade by £25–34 billion annually.
Beyond the numbers, the UK–India FTA carries outsized symbolism. It is the first trade deal India has signed with a European country since 1997, reflecting a geopolitical convergence as much as economics. Both nations are wary of China’s dominance and see value in diversifying supply chains. Both are services-driven economies looking to spur innovation. As one expert observed, “The deal between India and the UK is particularly important in a global environment of rising trade tensions and highlights the critical role of partnerships for shared progress and prosperity.” For Britain, clinching an accord with India, a proliferating “growth engine” of the 21st century, is a major post-Brexit victory in its bid to be a global trading nation. From India’s perspective, it marks a strategic embrace of a former colonial ruler now recast as an equal partner. Modi has hailed the agreement as “historic”, and it dovetails with his vision of India as a leading voice of the Global South engaging multiple great powers.
Yet this new chapter comes with convoluted historical undertones. UK–India relations are still shadowed by the legacy of empire, from colonial-era economic exploitation to the cultural ties (and fissures) that bind the two nations. The large Indian diaspora in Britain, including former Prime Minister Sunak’s own family background, provides a unique bridge, but also a reminder that the power dynamics have transformed. Britain today needs India more than India needs Britain, an almost unthinkable notion to earlier generations in London. This reality has forced the UK to negotiate on India’s terms, respecting New Delhi’s red lines on issues like immigration and patent protections. In a way, the protracted FTA talks became an exercise in postcolonial diplomacy, the UK, a once-dominant imperial power, having to “avoid both self-delusion and declinism” in re engaging a rising former colony. The end result, as the UK based Chatham House think tank concluded, is that Britain must embrace its identity as “a post-colonial European nation” with a global role, and there is nothing ignoble in that. The UK–India deal, forged through patience and pragmatism, illustrated that adjusted posture.
Balancing China, Betting on Allies
Trade is only one pillar of Britain’s Indo-Pacific play; the other is security. As China’s footprint expands westward through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a sprawling infrastructure scheme reaching into Africa, South Asia and even Europe, the geopolitical stakes are evident for the UK. Beijing’s BRI now involves investments in some 71 countries, an expansive bid to connect continents and remake global trade routes. Initially, London saw opportunity in BRI as British firms eyed contracts, and the UK even joined China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. But as strategic concerns mounted, from “debt-trap” diplomacy to the military implications of Chinese built ports, Britain’s tone had shifted. The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh bluntly labeled China a “epoch-defining challenge” to the international order. Then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced new measures to bolster Britain’s economic security and technological capabilities in the face of that challenge. In essence, the UK has aligned itself with allies like the US, Japan and Australia in viewing China as a strategic competitor to be checked through collective action.
Enter AUKUS, the trilateral security pact among Australia, the UK and the US unveiled in 2021. Best known for its plan to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, AUKUS is widely understood as a response to China’s growing naval power and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. By joining AUKUS Britain made a bold statement that it intends to remain a Pacific actor militarily, despite being geographically far from Asian flashpoints. The pact will see British submarines deployed in the Indo-Pacific and deepens defense-industrial cooperation between the three Anglo allies. While the UK’s strategic rationale for AUKUS was never formally articulated, there is “scholarly and policy consensus that it concerns the growing strategic challenge posed by…China” . Some analysts believe Britain actually has “the most to gain and least to lose” among the AUKUS partners. The agreement gives the UK a seat at the table of Indo-Pacific security and “enables the UK to develop a strategic foothold in the Indo-Pacific” via a tight coalition of trusted partners. It also helps London build up high-tech military capabilities like submarine know-how and a future nuclear workforce that might have been unaffordable alone .
At the same time, playing a more strategic role in Asia comes with perils that Britain is eyes-wide open about. By inserting itself into the US–China rivalry in the Pacific, the UK could become a target of Beijing’s ire or economic pressure. Chinese officials blasted AUKUS as a Cold War-style provocation, and regional reactions have been mixed. UK policymakers insist that a “free and open Indo-Pacific” benefits everyone and that Britain is “standing our ground” alongside allies in the face of aggressive behaviour . In concrete terms, the UK has stepped up naval deployments through Asian waters, a British aircraft carrier strike group sailed to the South China Sea in 2021, and coordinated more on intelligence and cybersecurity with Indo-Pacific partners. Britain has also bolstered defense ties with Japan and South Korea, two key Asian democracies. Joint military exercises and memoranda of cooperation have proliferated, and the UK is working with Japan and Italy on a next-generation fighter jet program, another sign that its Indo-Pacific engagement isn’t just about trade, but hard power too .
All these moves reflect a classic realist calculus, wherein, the UK seeks to protect its interests and uphold a favourable balance of power by reinforcing alliances and trying to constrain a potential adversary’s influence. In the Indian Ocean region specifically, Britain has pursued what one analyst terms an “uncertain link” strategy, maintaining naval assets and partnerships around critical chokepoints like the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to ensure it isn’t cut out of this pivotal theatre. The new base in Bahrain supports counter-piracy and freedom of navigation patrols that keep oil and commerce flowing. British warships have also made a point of transiting the South China Sea to assert international maritime rights, echoing US “freedom of navigation” operations. Through such actions, the UK signals that, even outside the EU, it intends to help shape the rules-based order from the Atlantic across to Asia.
A Post-Imperial Balancing Act
Ultimately, Britain’s emerging trade partnerships and Indo-Pacific forays amount to a grand experiment in post-imperial adjustment. The UK is no longer a superpower, by some measures not even a “great power,” and must calibrate ambitions to resources. “Britain is no longer a great power; it is a medium-size power… something it struggles to accept,” an observer commented on London’s global role . This reality elucidates the meticulous balance struck in British strategy. On one hand, London is striving to remain influential by leveraging its historic strengths, a global network of diplomatic ties, the English language, financial clout, and renowned soft-power institutions like the BBC and British universities. Its post-Brexit trade deals and Commonwealth outreach build on these assets, with UK officials often invoking the country’s unique convening power and flexible diplomacy. There is a conscious effort to brand Britain as a “partner of choice,” an honest broker that can bridge the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, North and South. As a group of foreign policy experts convened by Chatham House concluded, Britain could carve a niche as “the world’s informer and educator, the world’s convenor, and a champion for law and global order,” but only if it sustains a reputation for reliability and sheds any lingering illusions of grandeur.
On the other hand, the UK has had to confront criticisms that Global Britain is merely nostalgia for empire “dressed in new clothes.” Many in the European Union sneered at early talk of an Anglosphere renaissance as “Empire 2.0”, and even British civil servants privately used that term to mock the push for Commonwealth trade deals. Sensitive to this, UK trade officials have taken pains to stress mutual benefit and respect in negotiations. “Britain’s former colonies don’t want to be colonies again,” one observer noted pointedly as London prepared to host a 2018 Commonwealth summit. Commonwealth leaders insist on equality among the 53 member states , and British ministers openly acknowledge the need to avoid any “colonial connotations” in post-Brexit outreach. In practical terms, this means Britain often approaches trade talks with humility and willingness to compromise, a far cry from the impositions of its imperial past. Manifested in its deal with India, the UK accepted that New Delhi would not budge on certain protections and even agreed to a contentious pact covering social security contributions for Indian workers in Britain. Such flexibility recognises the political sensitivities on the Indian side, where any whiff of neo colonialism could derail an agreement.
Domestic politics in Britain also shape the calculus. Promoting “Global Britain” has been a flagship policy of the ruling Conservatives since 2016, used to project optimism about life after EU membership. Trade deals with Australia and New Zealand were triumphantly announced, though critics at home noted they offered minimal economic uplift and potentially undercut British farmers. The CPTPP accession likewise has been showcased as proof that Brexit has not left the UK isolated. Meanwhile, the opposition has largely backed the Indo-Pacific pivot in principle (underlining values such as democracy and human rights in Asia) but promises a more hard-nosed focus on results. If a Labour government takes over, it may double down on ensuring these new partnerships deliver tangible benefits for workers and exporters, even as it rebuilds ties with Europe. That could ensue more support for British businesses to enter Asian markets, answering Badenoch’s challenge that benefits will come “if they use it”. It might also mean a recalibration of defense commitments if domestic budgets are tight, although thus far there is cross-party consensus on the basics of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
From a realist viewpoint, the UK’s flurry of trade pacts and alliances is a logical adaptation to a multipolar era where power and growth are diffuse. Britain is hedging against over-reliance on any one region (be it a fractious Europe or an Asia dominated by China) by broadening its options. Each partnership, be it a tariff-cutting deal with Vietnam or naval exercises with Japan, adds a strand to a web of relations that Britain can leverage. Over time, this could yield a form of “extra clout” disproportionate to the UK’s size. Unequivocally, Britain still punches above its weight in areas like finance, higher education, and development aid, which complement its new trade strategy. Moreover, intangibles such as the rule of law, British common law-based institutions, and the credibility of British diplomacy (as a defender of Ukraine in Europe and a climate champion globally) feed into the appeal of partnering with the UK.
From a postcolonial perspective, however, Britain’s journey is also about coming to terms with its reduced status. The UK is learning to wield influence through persuasion and partnership rather than dominion. This is a humbling process, but one that can yield a more sustainable international role. As former Foreign Secretary David Miliband puts it, Britain must engage abroad in a way that “avoids both self-delusion and declinism,” neither pretending to imperial swagger nor wallowing in defeatism. The image of the UK that emerges is perhaps closer to a skilled mediator or coalition builder than a traditional great power. Whether hosting summits on climate finance for poorer nations, or being a go-between in Indo-Pacific disputes, the UK can leverage its diverse ties. It helps, too, that Britain’s past connections, even if born of empire, left a legacy of Commonwealth networks and English-speaking elites in many countries, giving it a foot in the door that others lack.
As Britain charts this path between the Atlantic and Indian oceans, the stakes are high. If successful, the UK could demonstrate how a middle-sized, post-imperial country can still shape global affairs through agility, expertise and strategic partnerships. If it falters, say, if trade deals don’t deliver or Asian powers see little need for London, then “Global Britain” might be recalled as an ambitious slogan that collided with hard truths. For now, the UK is pressing ahead, driven by equal parts ambition and adaptation. It has one eye on the Realist chessboard of power (ensuring it stays aligned with Washington and present in the Indo-Pacific), and another on the postcolonial imperative of redefining itself as a modern nation divorced from imperial fantasies. In the words of one candid analysis: “Britain’s voice has stopped being a roar.” But that does not mean silence. Instead, Britain is trying to find a new voice, measured, collaborative, and confident in tone, to sing its own chorus in the concert of nations. The success of its emerging trade partnerships and geopolitical overtures will determine how strongly that voice resonates from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean in the years ahead.