By Daksh Sahi
Early this month, long‑strained ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban government erupted into open conflict. The spark came on 9 October when explosions rocked Kabul and eastern provinces, which Taliban officials blamed on Pakistani airstrikes. Islamabad did not immediately acknowledge the strikes, but Pakistani security sources told Reuters the raids targeted Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants, including its leader Noor Wali Mehsud, in Kabul and Kandahar. Afghanistan’s Taliban denounced the attacks as “blatant violation of international law” and vowed retaliation.
Over the weekend of 11-12 October, Taliban fighters launched coordinated assaults on Pakistani frontier posts along the porous 2,600 km Durand Line. Late on Saturday, Afghan forces from multiple points in Kandahar, Kunar and Khost provinces opened fire on Pakistani border forts, using small arms, artillery and even tanks. Pakistan’s military said it “repelled” the assaults and counter‑attacked with gunfire, artillery and drone strikes into Afghan territory. Islamabad reported 23 soldiers killed, with dozens wounded, and claimed to have destroyed over 21 Taliban positions. The Taliban admitted nine fighters killed, but asserted it had inflicted far heavier losses, roughly 58 Pakistani soldiers, and captured scores of Pakistani posts. Independent observers were unable to verify the casualty figures, but both sides acknowledged a fierce clash.
By 12 October, exchanges of fire had largely subsided, and Pakistan closed its main border crossings, Torkham and Chaman, and imposed a 2‑week suspension of trade, stranding thousands of trucks on both sides. Islamabad flew jets over border areas to intimidate militants and deployed reserve forces; prime minister Shehbaz Sharif warned that Pakistan would “not tolerate” attacks from Afghan soil and demanded the Taliban act against the TTP. In Pakistan’s northwestern provinces, mass rallies brimmed with nationalist fervour, citizens chanted “Pakistan Zindabad” and “Pak Army Zindabad,” vowed to defend the country’s sovereignty, and urged the Taliban to respect the border. In Islamabad, the army publicly framed the clash as a justified retaliation for “militants” using Afghan territory to strike Pakistan.
On 13 October, Pakistani troops remained on high alert along the border. U.S. President Donald Trump even quipped he could help broker an end to the conflict as he headed overseas. That same day, intermittent skirmishes flared in the Kurram tribal area, including clashes involving Afghan‑based TTP units; Pakistani officials later claimed to have destroyed Afghan‐supplied tanks on their side of Kurram. Meanwhile, Kabul’s Taliban sent diplomats, including Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, then on a visit to New Delhi, to Tehran to seek support, and foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Qatar urged an immediate de‑escalation.
The fighting re‑erupted on 15 October with renewed intensity around Spin Boldak, Kandahar, and Chaman, Balochistan. Pakistan reported additional casualties and said its forces had taken further Afghan posts. International mediators, notably Qatar and Saudi Arabia, pressed both governments for a ceasefire. Late on 15 October, Islamabad announced a 48‑hour truce beginning that evening, which Afghanistan’s Taliban agreed to largely on Pakistani terms. By midday 16 October, the ceasefire held and heavy weapons fell silent. Sharif told his cabinet that Pakistan was “ready to talk” but insisted negotiations occur on Islamabad’s conditions. The Taliban’s spokesman affirmed the lull in fighting and thanked mediators for restoring calm.
Border Security and Trade Disruptions
The clashes underscored deep vulnerabilities in the Durand Line frontier. The fighting forced an immediate shutdown of cross‑border trade, with tens of thousands of container trucks left idle on both sides. Pakistan’s officials warned of “millions of rupees” in lost commerce, noting that landlocked Afghanistan relies heavily on Pakistani ports for fuel, food and supplies. Analysts stress that any prolonged border closure will further strain Kabul’s beleaguered economy and endanger food and medicine flows. In turn, Islamabad fears that Taliban‑held Afghan territory offers insurgents easy ingress into Pakistan’s northwest, especially now that paved roads and displaced villages make cross‑border surveillance harder. The security establishment has ramped up patrols and drone reconnaissance along the frontier, and Pakistan’s parliament approved funding to extend and modernise frontier fences.
For regional counter‑terrorism, the clashes inject profound uncertainty. Islamabad’s narrative is that “some militants are using Afghan soil” to strike Pakistani targets. Pakistan demanded the Taliban crack down on the “haunts” of groups like the TTP, the Pakistani Taliban, in Kunar and Khost. The Afghan Taliban, who seized power in 2021 after the US abandonment, counter that they do not allow sanctuaries for anti‑Pakistani fighters, and even accused Pakistani authorities of hosting their own militants such as the Islamic State Khorasan, ISKP to destabilise Kabul. This tit‑for‑tat has escalated mistrust, for Islamabad, the unresolved TTP issue on Afghan soil has become intolerable; for the Taliban, Pakistani airstrikes in Kabul represented an illegal aggression.
In Islamabad’s domestic politics, the conflict has bolstered nationalist consensus around the military. Pakistan’s Army and its Inter‑Services Intelligence (ISI) have historically driven Afghanistan policy, and they now portray the strike‑and‑retaliate cycle as a necessary “deterrence” strategy. The civilian government of Prime Minister Sharif, though constitutionally in charge, has publicly deferred to military sources for casualty figures and operational claims as did Sharif himself. Opposition parties largely voiced support for defending the homeland. Public rallies across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the province most exposed to spillover, were unanimous in condemning Afghanistan’s “unprovoked firing” and celebrating the Pakistan Army’s response. Only minority voices cautioned restraint; the prevailing sentiment was that Pakistan must treat the post‑2021 border status quo as a new “red line,” any attack from Afghan territory will be met with force in kind.
Yet there are warnings about the campaign’s risks. Pakistani analysts note that continued cross‑border attacks could deepen Afghanistan’s instability, potentially aggravating refugee flows into Pakistan and undermining whatever international legitimacy the Taliban have gained. In Islamabad’s power corridors, some officials fear that a drawn‑out war would play into the hands of hardliners at home and abroad, echoing the hardline narrative that India backs the militants, while blaming any ceasefire on political weakness. Others argue Pakistan’s fierce reaction is meant to shore up the military’s standing after a difficult year, marked by an unprecedented conflict with India in May 2025, and to signal Pakistan’s hardening posture to both Kabul and New Delhi .
From Backers to Adversaries
To understand the October flare‑up, one must recall Pakistan’s long, fraught relationship with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s military and ISI have backed the Taliban since their inception in the mid-1990s. Islamabad provided sanctuary, training and materiel to Mullah Omar’s movement, even sending officers and thousands of Pashtun infantry to fight alongside the Taliban against rival Afghan factions. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the only states to officially recognise the Taliban’s 1996–2001 Islamic Emirate. Over two decades (2001–2021), the Taliban leadership largely operated from Pakistan’s Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions. A NATO study and the U.S. 9/11 Commission later found that ISI support was “critical to the survival and revival” of the Taliban insurgency after 2001.
When U.S.-backed forces took Kabul in 2001, Pakistan publicly allied with the new Afghan government, but it also quietly maintained ties with the insurgency. Islamabad hoped the Taliban would re-form as a pragmatic, Pakistan‑friendly government once U.S. troops departed. In August 2021, when the Taliban swept back into power, many Pakistani leaders celebrated. Prime Minister Imran Khan proclaimed that Afghans had “broken the shackles of slavery,” and Nawaz Sharif’s party expressed optimism for new trade ties. However, the honeymoon was brief. From 2022 onward Pakistan was beset by a surge of militant attacks at home. The Pakistani Taliban (TTP), largely regrouped on Afghan soil, intensified bombings and raids in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Pakistan repeatedly pressed the Taliban government to expel or disarm the TTP, which publicly pledged allegiance to Taliban supreme leader Haibatullah Akhunzada. Kabul’s rulers insisted the TTP was an internal Pakistani issue, but Islamabad’s patience wore thin. Analysts note that Islamabad felt the Taliban “loyalties lay elsewhere,” as Pakistani militants struck inside Pakistan and Kabul made no visible effort to chase them down .
By October 2025, the mistrust had mounted for years. Pakistan’s security establishment viewed the border clashes as partly the consequence of these collapsed post-2021 expectations. Security analysts point out that a short-lived TTP ceasefire negotiated by Imran Khan in 2022 fell apart, and that after Khan’s removal in late 2022 violence surged again. Meanwhile, Taliban leaders tried to diversify relations, opening a channel with New Delhi in October 2025 was a remarkable feat, further unsettling Islamabad. Hence, the October 2025 conflict was not a spontaneous skirmish but a flare‑up of long‑standing grievances, Pakistan accusing the Taliban of harbouring anti‑Pakistani militants, and the Taliban resenting Pakistani interference.
Pakistan’s Domestic Landscape
Domestically, the clashes have strengthened the military’s hand in Pakistan’s highly charged politics. The Pakistani Army, historically dominant over civilian rulers, was quick to seize the narrative. Army spokespersons issued graphic videos of destroyed border posts and repeatedly blamed Kabul for “unprovoked aggression”. Prime Minister Sharif, a supposedly civilian leader, consistently echoed military talking points and even thanked soldiers and reservists for their “gallant performance”. Political parties, including opposition factions, largely rallied behind the army’s stance. Criticism of the operation was muted in national media, and Parliament held emergency sessions.
The broader context is one of national crisis. Pakistan’s economy remains fragile, and any perceived threats from Afghanistan fuel nationalist anxieties. The government stressed at home that protecting the frontier was part of Pakistan’s very identity. Public opinion, especially in tribal and Pashtun areas, overwhelmingly supported using force to secure the border. The extent of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, including dozens killed in Kabul, prompted little public outcry in Pakistan. Instead, televised coverage focused on Pakistani martyrs and the suffering of their families. While some human-rights voices lamented the regional blowback, the political debate in Islamabad centered on how to use the confrontation to reinforce Pakistan’s red lines against militancy.
Analysts warn, however, that a clash with Afghanistan brings its own risks. Hardliners in Pakistan’s military view this as a chance to contain the TTP threat, but hawks must avoid a prolonged war that could embolden other militant groups, like ISKP, or even entangle Pakistan in Afghanistan’s internal strife. The army appears intent on a new “deterrence” doctrine, Pakistani officials and scholars openly argue that “any attack which emanates from Afghanistan will be responded to with the same ferocity on their territory”. This mirrors the Indian posture after its May 2025 strikes in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Yet history suggests caution, decades of cross‑border retaliation risk blowback, as seen after Pakistan’s 2001-2004 offensives. In the meantime, Sharif’s civilian government will have to balance supporting the military’s stance while managing international fallout, even though the real decision making lies with Field Marshal Asim Munir and his coterie of generals.
Taliban’s Internal Dynamics and Militant Groups
Within Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership faces complex dilemmas as well. Their government holds no international legitimacy or aid, and a disruptive war with Pakistan could compound Afghanistan’s isolation and economic calamity. Taliban spokesmen have downplayed the conflict’s depth, saying they want peace with all neighbours. They deny any Pakistani claims of harbouring Pakistani militants, a claim repeated after the 11-12 October attacks, and instead accuse Islamabad of harbouring ISIS-K fighters.
Key to the crisis are cross‑border militants. Chief among them is the Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP is a Pashtun insurgent umbrella group that fought Pakistani forces vigorously before 2014, infamously attacking a Peshawar school in 2014, killing 150 children. In recent years TTP fighters have drifted into Afghan border regions. Pakistan accuses Kabul of giving the TTP sanctuary; the Taliban insist the TTP holds no Afghan territory and that any such militants are remnants of a bygone era. Both sides know this is only partially true. Analysts note that over 600 attacks in 2024-25 were attributed to the TTP inside Pakistan. While Taliban officials have told Pakistan that reintegrating or expelling the TTP is Pakistan’s problem, Islamabad views this as untenable given the bloodshed.
The Taliban have been ambivalent about fighting the TTP. Ideologically the two groups are aligned, both seek rigid Islamic law, and they have social ties dating back decades. Many TTP leaders publicly pledged allegiance to Taliban commander Haibatullah Akhunzada in 2021. Taliban analysts warn that a harsh crackdown on the TTP could drive that cadre into the arms of the even more radical Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP) or cause internal dissent. For now, Kabul has tacitly tolerated the TTP’s presence, after a brief 2022 truce, brokered by the Taliban between the TTP and Pakistani army, broke down, the Taliban largely withdrew from mediating. This non-interference policy has enraged Pakistan, which insists that fighting the TTP must be part of any peace with Islamabad.
In addition to the TTP, Pakistan also points to other insurgents in Afghanistan as threats. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist group, has claimed attacks in Pakistan, and Islamabad accuses the Taliban of harbouring BLA cadres. The Taliban, who fought and expelled ISKP from urban centers in 2021-24, turn the tables by accusing Pakistan of sheltering former Afghan warlords and ISIS-K remnants to foment unrest in Afghanistan. In essence, a convoluted web of proxy claims exists, each side accuses the other of using militant proxies to undermine its security. On the ground, though, most analysts agree that it is the TTP’s cross‑border raids that are the immediate catalyst of the October fighting.
Regional and International Reactions
The border war drew swift reactions from regional powers. China, a close ally of Pakistan and a major stakeholder in Afghan stability, via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, urged restraint. Beijing’s foreign ministry appealed to “remain calm and exercise restraint,” and assured both sides that Chinese nationals and investments in the region must be protected. Chinese officials quietly offered to mediate and even mentioned that President Xi was closely monitoring the situation. In practice, China is worried that any sustained Pakistan-Afghanistan war could threaten its Afghan projects and destabilise Xinjiang’s borders.
Iran, which shares a western Afghan frontier, reacted with alarm. Tehran warned that the clashes risked dangerous “spillover” into the region. Iran’s foreign ministry repeatedly called for immediate talks and restraint from both parties, stressing that any Afghanistan-Pakistan estrangement could spread beyond their borders. When the ceasefire was announced on 15 October, Iran publicly “welcomed” the truce and reiterated its readiness to help de-escalate, while urging regional cooperation to fight militancy. In private, Iran is keen to limit U.S. influence in both Islamabad and Kabul, so it has positioned itself as a neutral interlocutor. Notably, Taliban officials flew to Tehran for emergency consultations during the fighting, underscoring Iran’s role as a trusted mediator for Kabul.
India, long an adversary of Pakistan, saw the conflict through the lens of its own rivalry. New Delhi expressed full support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty and repeatedly accused Islamabad of “hosting terrorist organisations.” On 16 October India’s MEA spokesman Randhir Jaiswal declared that “two things are clear: Pakistan hosts terrorists and is infuriated with Afghanistan exercising sovereignty”. India noted that Afghanistan’s top envoy was in Delhi during the first explosions, and used the opportunity to strengthen ties, India also announced it would reopen its embassy in Kabul and upgrade its mission to the Taliban government. Pakistan’s press, in turn, depicted this as Indian meddling, echoing Islamabad’s long-standing trope that New Delhi is backing anti-Pakistan militants via Kabul.
Other regional players played diplomatic cards. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which host Taliban envoys, publicly urged dialogue and calm. Arab media credited Qatar with helping broker the October truce. Afghanistan’s Taliban leadership emphasises that it seeks “good relations with all neighbours”, and even cited meetings in Tehran as proof of its outreach. Meanwhile, Trump himself jokingly offered to intervene upon his return from a Middle East tour. However, there was no immediate U.S. policy action beyond public statements urging both sides to halt the fighting.
China’s and India’s strategic competition in the region also colours reactions. Beijing is invested in a stable Pakistan and has growing ties with Kabul, including talks on a Beijing-Moscow transport corridor through Afghanistan. India, by contrast, sees the Taliban as unreliable but useful to counter Pakistan, hence its recent outreach. Neither Beijing nor New Delhi wants the frontier to ignite a wider war, but each interprets the violence through its own prism, China urges stability to protect projects, India uses it to underscore Pakistan’s terrorist proclivities. Iran, facing spillover risks, calls for dialogue and offers mediation, seeing the border flare‑up as a threat to its western flank. All three, India, China and Iran, have publicly backed restraint, but they each watch the outcomes for their own strategic calculations in South Asia.
Later this month, both Pakistan and Afghanistan had little appetite for a full-scale war. The ceasefire, enforced by Gulf mediators, was respected even as some mistrust persisted. Pakistan’s leadership reiterated that any future Pakistani‑mounted talks must include action on militant sanctuaries, and vowed to resume strikes if attacks resume. Kabul’s Taliban, strapped for cash and legitimacy, signalled willingness to negotiate but offered no pledges beyond general respect for sovereignty.
Analysts agree that a lasting resolution will be hard. As Hameed Hakimi of Al Jazeera argues, geography and history tie the two nations together, Afghanistan remains landlocked and economically reliant on Pakistan, while Pakistan’s own security is entangled with Afghan stability. Experts from Islamabad to Washington call for creative mediation, with Qatar and Iran already stepping in. Absent a sustained peace effort, any miscalculation, even a stray drone or infiltration, could reignite hostilities. For now, however, both sides quietly acknowledge that neither can afford war, Pakistan is keen to re-open trade routes before winter rains set in, and the Taliban can ill‑afford to fight on two fronts, at home against ISKP and abroad against Pakistan. Whether this uneasy calm lasts will depend on whether Islamabad and Kabul can address the core dispute, the fate of cross‑border militants and mutual trust in each other’s sovereignty.