By Inaya
The past decade has seen combat evolve from human-led engagements to battles dominated by machines including drones, robots and now AI-enabled sensors. Today’s “modern battlefield” integrates unmanned air, land, sea, and even space systems with networked intelligence and electronic warfare, vastly compressing decision cycles and force multipliers. This trend, driven by advances in AI, miniaturised sensors, high-bandwidth communications and swarms, is reshaping how militaries fight. Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have provided laboratories for these technologies in action. And the resulting pressure has sent defence industries worldwide scrambling to supply new autonomous capabilities, even as diplomats and legal experts grapple with the implications
How Battles Are Changing
Ukraine has become the epitome, what began in 2022 as improvised quadcopters was rapidly industrialised into a fullscale unmanned warfare campaign. Both Ukraine and Russia now deploy millions of small drones a year for
surveillance, artillery spotting, kamikaze strikes and more. One estimate puts Russian and Ukrainian drone production at 4 million units annually and China’s world-leading output at twice that. Ukrainian forces use swarms of loitering munitions to attack across the front, while counter-drone nets and new EW tactics such as fiber-optic “cable” drones that blind enemy sensors have turned the airspace into an “electronic battlefield”. Naval warfare has seen a leap too as Ukraine’s use of unmanned surface vessels, explosive boats guided by shore control, against Russian ships in the Black Sea has demonstrated how cheap drones can achieve sea-denial when integrated with missiles and cyber-attacks.
In Gaza and the Levant, AI and automation have also transformed conflict. Israel was already deploying “tens of thousands of autonomous systems” from intelligence drones to ground robots in the recent Gaza war. Officials hailed the Gaza campaign as the “first robotics war,” with UGV convoys, armored bulldozers and APCs, clearing minefields and supply routes, and hundreds of loitering munitions autonomously homing in on targets. Some strike drones such as the Harop kamikaze can re-assess their aim in flight, combining sensor data with onboard AI. Even social-media and satellite imagery feeds have been fed into new targeting databases known as “Lavender” and “Hasbara” systems that rapidly identify likely Hamas positions for attack. Meanwhile, last year Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen launched waves of cheap drones and missile boats at shipping and military bases, demonstrating that autonomous tactics are no longer confined to state armies. Aircraft, rockets, cyber and drones now operate in one fused battlespace, what some call “multi-domain battle”, and armies are forced to adapt to an enemy that can strike at speed and scale without risking pilots.
This revolution extends beyond hardware. Doctrine is shifting to treat drones and AI like ammunition. The U.S. Army is moving exponentially from around 50,000 drones per year to planning to buy 1 million in the next 2 to 3 years.
Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll says drones will be treated as “expendable” munitions, reflecting lessons from Ukraine’s drone swarms. Training and command structures are also adapting as analysts now envision “battle managers” overseeing mixed teams of human and robot units, with human supervisors directing swarms via intuitive interfaces while AI handles navigation and threat avoidance. Military exercises increasingly simulate high-EM interference and satellite-denied environments, preparing operators to trust and manage autonomous wingmen under realistic 5G-saturated conditions.
Late last month, Israel and the U.S. struck deep inside Iran, killing its supreme leader, prompting Tehran’s revolutionary guard to retaliate en masse. Hundreds of missiles and thousands of drones were launched at once. Iran claims the IRGC fired over 500 ballistic missiles and some 2,000 Shahed-type attack UAVs since the fighting began. These volleys targeted a broad array of foes: Israeli cities, U.S. bases and allied capitals.
For instance, Bahrain, which hosts a U.S. naval base, took multiple drone strikes on March 1. Reuters footage shows Iranian UAVs striking buildings in Manama. Gulf Arab air defenses responded with intensity. The UAE reported intercepting 1,001 out of 1,072 incoming Iranian drones. Kuwait similarly tracked 384 drones and claims to have downed them all. Qatar and Saudi Arabia also engaged and destroyed dozens of Iranian UAVs. In other words, thousands of low-cost drones overwhelmed the region’s skies in days. These UAVs were mostly the same designs Iran supplied to its proxies, “Shahed” loitering munitions made for tank or radar busting, now used in a direct state-on-state strike campaign.
Hezbollah in Lebanon joined the fray too. After years of restraint, the militia launched its own guided rockets and drones at northern Israel. Israeli jets immediately retaliated by bombing Hezbollah strongpoints in Beirut’s suburbs. Even other neighbours were caught up, Cypriot and Jordanian air forces scrambled fighter jets and even Patriot missiles to knock down Iranian drones approaching their airspace. Two Iranian UAVs even flew into Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, striking the airport. The Islamic Republic’s strategy was clear: a region-wide asymmetric offensive using unmanned systems as the main deliverer of force.
These drone barrages also hit critical infrastructure. In Saudi Arabia, a swarm of drones and missiles damaged the Ras Tanura oil terminal, one of the world’s largest, satellite images confirmed fires and operational halts. Shipping in the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted as Iranian boats fired drones at commercial vessels. Regional leaders expressed alarm, British PM Starmer even authorised using RAF jets from Cyprus to shoot down Iranian UAVs aimed at Israel or Cyprus. According to Iranian state media, roughly 40% of the drone launches targeted Israel and 60% the U.S. and its partners.
The Middle East has effectively entered a new “drone war.” Iran’s direct use of swarm drones, supplementing proxy attacks, is unprecedented in scale. Ubiquitous UAVs now dart across multiple skies from Persian Gulf capitals to Israel to southern Lebanon linking theatres into one conflict. The campaign underscores how militaries like Iran’s view drones as force multipliers that can compensate for limited air power. Analysts note that even though most Iranian drones were shot down, Gulf states boast near-100% interception, the psychological and strategic impact is high. Civilian areas and energy facilities are no longer safe from unmanned attack. As one US official remarked, the Iran crisis has “electrified a whole new class of drones,” making them a central weapon in any Middle East showdown
Industry Race and Procurement Shifts
Defence industries have responded to this new era with a scramble for autonomy. Global military R&D and procurement now prioritises sensors, data links, AI algorithms and unmanned platforms. National Defense Budgets reflect this, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports record military spending of $2.44 trillion in 2023, a 6.8% jump. The US alone spent 9.4% more on R&D than in 2022, with Congress earmarking $9.8 billion in FY2026 specifically for unmanned/autonomous systems. In practical terms, major budgets have funnelled into autonomy programs, the US Navy boosted its AI spend by 22.7% year-over-year, and the Space Force’s budget now totals nearly $40 billion, including missile warning satellites. In the UK, the 2023 Strategic Defence Review explicitly cited the war in Ukraine to justify a £142 million injection into drones and counter-drone tech in 2025. Even smaller countries like Poland and South Korea have set up dedicated funds and accelerators to fund swarming drone prototypes and robot vehicles.
Private industry is booming accordingly. Global market research forecasts “AI in defense” to grow from $12.5 bn in 2024 to $22.8 bn by 2029. Key drivers are next-generation unmanned vehicles, sensor fusion and cloud-based threat analysis. Companies from traditional primes to tech giants are moving in, Lockheed Martin, L3Harris and RTX are integrating AI into missiles and reconnaissance systems, while Microsoft, IBM and NVIDIA push AI algorithms for command software. Smaller firms are also major players, Shield AI (US) acquired Sentient Vision (Australia) in 2025 to strengthen its loitering-munition tech. On the startup side, dozens of UAV and UGV makers have won contracts with notable examples being contracts for $25M to build unmanned subs and $7.5M for autonomous helicopters in the UK. Venture investment in military AI has spiked driven by the expectation of multi-billion-dollar returns as governments scramble to procure.
Procurement models are changing too. Governments are streamlining regulations and partnering with commercial tech firms to accelerate fielding. The US Pentagon’s recent memo “rescinded restrictive policies” on drone production. Congress is even considering building a Texas factory to churn out up to one million drones per year, rather than relying on foreign supply. The new UAS-summit dialogues emphasise agile acquisition as one panelist noted, Ukraine’s rapid prototype-to-field cycle, days instead of years, has forced the US to rethink bureaucratic bottlenecks. The UKDI and similar EU initiatives now pre-approve broad R&D pipelines to let dozens of SMEs innovate in parallel, rather than funding one big prime contractor. Meanwhile, to secure inputs, companies are reshoring critical supply-chains as US forces hope to “domesticate” production of drone motors, batteries and chips that had been concentrated in China.
Cybersecurity and data networks have also become central. Modern autonomous weapons rely on continuous connectivity through GPS, satcom or 5G to coordinate and receive updates, creating new vulnerabilities. Defense contractors must now comply with strict cybersecurity frameworks such as the US DOD’s CMMC standard, often at high compliance cost. Space assets (satellites) and high-altitude drones now form part of a global C3I network, meaning that attacks in space or on comms links can disable hundreds of drones at once. Consequently, governments are funding anti-drone (C-UAS) systems as well, the US market for C-UAS is projected to reach nearly $20 billion by 2035, and the UK committed £30 million to homeland counter-drone tech to guard against “grey-zone” air incursions.
Industry Lessons from the Front Lines
Real-world conflicts have become R&D accelerators. Ukraine’s conflict in particular has spawned industrial lessons. Open-source reporting shows Ukraine’s drone sector exploded from a handful of hobbyists in 2022 to a defense industry making over 4 million UAVs in 2024. Revenues hit about €2.3 billion in 2024 and are set to double or triple in 2025. Even global manufacturers are studying Ukraine’s model of rapid prototyping with off-the-shelf parts and 3D printing. This “democratisation” of UAV production from garage workshops to state factories under the “Army of Drones” program suggests a future where small nations can pivot quickly and undercut legacy industries. Western firms have taken note as US Army Secretary Driscoll explicitly cited Ukraine’s output and aims to match it, and he says he will partner with commercial drone makers even those supplying Amazon to scale production.
Israel’s Gaza experience offers its own industrial insights. Israeli R&D director Yaron Sarig says decades of investment produced “tens of thousands” of robots in action, but the army also proved that unmanned systems must be cheap and networked. Industrial players like IAI and Elbit showcased new loitering munitions and AI-managed guard towers. Tel Aviv’s firms are now embedding urban combat data into their designs, an example being, obstacle-avoiding programming from tunnel warfare. One Israeli company has built a “combat drone” that can patrol autonomously, a sign that the once-theoretical “neural drones” are nearing maturity.
Globally, defence primes are cannibalising themselves toward autonomy. Lockheed and Northrop now buy or partner with swarming-UAV startups; Airbus and Boeing are forming teams on combat-drone programs; and dozens of incumbent avionics companies have created AI labs. Simultaneously, software firms, primarily Nvidia and Palantir, view military AI as a growth sector, pitching data analysis tools to armies. Even Asian tech firms are in the race with China’s Huawei and state-funded AI labs known to have worked on C4ISR for UAVs, while South Korea’s Hanwha and Hyundai are converting commercial robots for military use. The net result is a defense ecosystem where autonomy and AI are the new generics, one cannot build a modern jet or tank without those capabilities.
Sectoral Shifts Across the Force
The autonomous push is rippling through all military domains. Land forces now routinely deploy unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics, engineering and surveillance. In Gaza, Israel used commandeered D9 armoured bulldozers as robotic mine-clearers, and small UGVs carried ammo to the front. In Ukraine, both armies have experimented with remote-controlled tanks and robot scouts, though communication challenges such as jammed radios limit UGV use to secured areas. Still, the concept of a “manned-unmanned teaming” armoured force is gaining traction as Israeli planners envision two tanks working with two robotic “wingmen” that screen ahead, launch mini-drones and draw enemy fire. Internationally, armies are fast-tracking robotic infantry supports like Hyundai’s RCV-L we dubbed “Big Brother for Infantry” to carry gear and perform resupply under fire.
In the air domain, UAVs dominate. Traditional manned fighters still pilot the skies, but even those are now surrounded by drone swarms. The US Air Force’s next “Loyal Wingman” prototype, an AI-flown fighter escort, and smaller drones are in testing, reflecting a shift toward pilot-supervised swarms rather than solo jet duels. Commercial drone vendors see a direct line to military, Wing Loong and Bayraktar-style armed drones, once novelties, are now major platforms; Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 became standard gear for Ukraine early in the war. Autonomy is even creeping into air defence, autonomous intercept drones are on the drawing board to swarm-engage incoming threats without risking pilots. Meanwhile, electronic warfare, once an afterthought, has become indispensable; both Russia and Ukraine jam and spoof each other’s drone swarms constantly.
Naval warfare is being redefined too. As Ukraine showed, unmanned vessels let a relatively weak navy contest the seas. Armenia’s Javelin-class USVs, improvised drone boats, sank a Russian tug and damaged a frigate in 2022. On the other side of the globe, US Navy and Coast Guard are developing long-range anti-submarine drones and autonomous minesweepers. Counter-UAS interest has spilled into maritime, fleets now carry lasers and nets to down drones, anticipating anti-ship missile-carrying drones from rogue states or militias. Hence, a future flotilla might include half crewed ships and half robot boats, with AI managing screening and targeting at high speed.
Even space and cyber are not only entwined in this shift but have emerged as incredibly complex frontiers of it. Militaries now plan GPS-denied or satellite-contested scenarios as routine. Space-launch costs are falling, enabling resilient constellations of small surveillance satellites to support autonomy. Cybersecurity is likewise mission-critical, an AI-guided tank is only as good as its immunisation against hacking. Recent “drone wars” have often hinged on hacking data links. Thus national strategies now include securing the undersea cables, satellites and 5G nodes that autonomous systems rely on. Space Force and equivalent commands have boomed globally, governments are scrubbing old procurement rules to buy anti-satellite lasers and resilient comms for a new arms race off Earth.
Ethics, Law and the Geopolitics of Autonomy
As these technologies advance, international debate rages on how to control them. Humanitarian groups and many UN member states demand rules of the road. In May 2025, over 120 countries signalled support for negotiating a treaty banning “lethal autonomous weapons” without human oversight. UN Secretary-General Guterres and the ICRC have called for legally binding limits by 2026. The proposals generally aim to forbid any “fire-and-forget” systems that target people without meaningful human control, responding to concerns that drones making kill decisions could violate the principles of distinction, proportionality and accountability. A new HRW report bluntly warns that autonomous targeting threatens basic rights like life and dignity.
But progress is slow and dawdling in light of recent conflicts. The Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) group has discussed autonomous systems for a decade but remains deadlocked. Key military powers, notably the US, Russia, China, India and Israel, have blocked binding measures in the CCW to preserve flexibility. Those states argue that human oversight will still be maintained on deployed systems and that technology cannot be stopped. For now, consensus is only on non-binding “best practices,” some NATO nations have issued voluntary AI ethics guidelines, for instance. SIPRI experts note that procurement can actually help enforce standards by requiring audits and testing on AI systems, governments can embed IHL compliance in how drones and robots are bought. But this is largely aspirational and varies by country.
Geopolitically, the AI arms race is escalating. China’s official policy as stated in its 2025 arms-control white paper emphasises defensive uses of AI but also highlights outer space, cyber and AI as new arenas for strategic competition. Chinese military journals admit they face hurdles in autonomy, secure communications and reliable “trustworthy” AI remain elusive, but Beijing is pouring R&D into drone fleets and satellite constellations. Meanwhile, emerging powers see autonomy as a force equaliser. Iran and North Korea share drone tech with proxies such as Hezbollah and Houthis, exporting autonomised strike capabilities. Even some African and Asian states are buying or indigenously building drones; the frontier threat could become any actor with access to cheap swarm drones.
Therefore, autonomous warfare is reaching a tipping point. On one side, defense industries and militaries are racing to field unmanned swarms, smart sensors and AI commanders backed by record budgets. On the other, legal and ethical frameworks struggle to keep pace, as clashes in Ukraine and Gaza make clear how rapidly these tools are changing combat. The result is a battlefield where soldiers, lawyers and policymakers alike must adapt: a single poorly supervised targeting algorithm could spark international uproar, while a well-placed robot convoy could determine the next front line. As one Israeli general put it, we are still “at the beginning of this revolution,” but its outlines and risks are already starkly visible.